The United States has the best-equipped and biggest-budgeted fighting force on the face of the Earth. Is carrying the biggest stick still a strategic advantage if the act of possession makes us more inclined to use it?
Future Peace is a sequel to the book Future War. In the excerpt below, Dr. Latiff looks at the impact that America's lionization of its armed forces in the post-Vietnam era and new access to unproven tech have on our ability to mitigate conflict and prevent armed violence.
Robert H. Latiff wrote Future Peace: Technology, Aggression, and the Rush to War. The University of Notre Dame Press was published. Robert H. Latiff is the owner of this copyrighted work. All rights belong to the person.
I served in the military for decades, from the end of the Vietnam War to the invasion of Iraq and the war on terror. The military went from being distrusted by the public to being revered by the public. Extremes are neither good or healthy. Over the next decade, military leaders succeeded in reestablishing trust and competency. The redemption was further solidified by the Reagan build up. The fall of the USSR and the victory of the US in the First Gulf War demonstrated how far we have come. The US military was everywhere over the next decade, and America's dominant technological prowess was on full display. The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq ensured that the military would demand the public's respect and attention. I have seen an attitude toward the military that has evolved from public mockery to grudging respect. The military is one of the most respected institutions in the country. The military is one thing, but militarism is something else and the public should be concerned about. We have become militaristic as a nation. Diplomacy will be considered as an unimportant part of the international problem if it is looked at through a military lens. National security issues include budget deficits and demographic trends. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are all now referred to as "warfighters", even those who sit behind a desk or operate satellites thousands of miles in space. We talk about threats and dismiss those who disagree as weak or unpatriotic.
The young men and women who serve deserve the best equipment the US has to offer. We can show them respect by trying to understand more about them and by questioning the mindset that is so eager to use them in conflicts. In the words of a soldier frequently deployed to war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan, an important question is how nearly two decades of sustained combat operations have changed how the Army sees itself. I feel that the Army is more defined by the wars it fights than it is by the service it provides. At first glance, this observation may seem silly. The Army exists to fight wars. The effects of American fascination with militarism were described in a 1955 pamphlet by the American Friends Service Committee.
Alternative diplomatic, economic, and social policies that are needed to prevent war can't be pursued because of the open-ended nature of the commitment to militarization. Huge burdens on society are imposed by the constant preparation for war and large-scale investment in military readiness. Mass opinion is easily manipulated to fan the flames of nationalism and military jingoism because of the corrosive effect that militantization has on social values.
The national situation with regard to the Vietnam War was described by Barbara Tuchman. If we failed to meet the imagined threat, there would be a conjuring up of specters and visions of ruin. The second was the illusion of omnipotence and the failure to understand that conflicts were not alwayssoluble by American force. Third was an attitude of "Don't confuse me with the facts" and a refusal to credit evidence in decision-making. There was a total absence of reflective thought about what we were doing. Military action was embraced by political leaders because of their view of military superiority. The public was unwilling to challenge such thinking.
We don't know whether computer networks are secure or if the information they carry is legit. Other countries are launching satellites, outer space is getting crowded, and there is increased talk of competition and conflict in space. The use of radio-frequency (RF) signals to damage, disrupt, or spoof other systems is being rediscovered by the military. Cyber war and electronic warfare have a focus on speed and ambiguity. Cyber incidents and space incidents give the hotheads reason to call for response and the cooler heads reason to question the wisdom of such a move.
What could cause us to fight? Beyond the geographical hot spots, a mistake or miscalculation in the ongoing probes of each other's computer networks could cause an unwanted response. US weapon systems are vulnerable to such probes. The Government Accountability Office found mission-critical vulnerabilities in systems, and testers were able to take control of systems that were largely undetected. Government managers didn't accept the seriousness of the situation. A cyber probe of our infrastructure could be mistaken for an attack and result in reprisals, setting off response and counter response, escalating in severity, and possibly lethality. The DOD uses space systems that are vulnerable to intrusion and interference from other countries. Electronic warfare against military radios and radars is a growing concern.
China and Russia both have space programs that they intend to challenge the US in. The situation is ripe for misinterpretation as both low-earth andgeosynchronous orbits become increasingly crowded and adversary countries engage in close approaches to our satellites. Intelligence gathering could be misconstrued as an attack and could generate a response either on the ground or in space. There could be attacks on our space systems. There could be misunderstandings with too close approaches of other satellites. Space-based or ground-based interference, jamming, or dazzling by lasers are possible threats. Intelligence analysts believe that the ground-based laser site in China is for attacks against US satellites. Russia has been keeping with high-value US systems. New technology weapons give their owners a new sense of invincibility, and an action that might have been considered too dangerous or provocative in the past might now be considered worth the risk.
The US has a high dependence on networks. In a highly charged atmosphere, the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding incidents involving some of the new war-fighting technologies can easily lead to misperceptions and ultimately, violence. The battlefield is chaotic and unpredictable. It is more so because of technological additions and vulnerabilities. A former UK spy chief said that technology has allowed humans to connect, reign, and share information almost instantaneously anywhere in the world.
It's easy to see how an ambiguous environment could make a soldier or military unit anxious. Consider a human who is excessively nervous, psychologists and neuroscientists tell us that is likely to develop violent tendencies. Under pressure, an individual is not likely to exhibit rational behavior. The military can also become nervous, super sensitive, jumpy, andtrigger-happy just as a human can. A military situation in which threats and uncertainty abound will make the forces anxious ornery. Some humans are able to deal with ambiguity. There is an open question about the ability of machines to do that.
Thousands or millions of lines of software code are not perfect. A computer error in one country could cause a reaction in another. A computer exploit that is intended to gather intelligence or steal data could cause a non proportional and possibly catastrophic response to disrupt a critical part of an electric grid, a flight control system, or a financial system. The world and military operations are vastly more complicated because of the hyper-connectedness of people and systems. Some military scholars are concerned about emerging technologies and the possibility of conflict brought on by decisions made by systems that we do not fully understand. Do the intimate connections and rapid communication of information make a reaction more likely? Does the design for speed and automation allow for rational assessment, or will it ensure that a threat impulse is matched by an immediate, unfiltered response? When the speed of operations is so great that a commander feels compelled to act immediately even if he or she does not understand what is happening, command and control can sometimes break down. We could make bad and dangerous decisions if we don't fully understand the systems.
If operators don't understand technological systems, they can cascade out of control. The events at Chernobyl are proof of that. Flawed reactor design and inadequately trained personnel led to a fatal series of mistakes. The start of World War I was marked by the use of railroads, telegraphs, the bureaucracy of mass Mobilization, and machine guns. Decision makers were put under pressure to strike first before the adversary was ready because of the potential to deploy huge armies in a hurry. The technology of 1914 created the same pressure for a first strike. Americans are impatient. The computer networks, satellites, and other modern infrastructures are vulnerable and give a strong advantage to either side. In our era of rapid technological change, threats and opportunities arise from a new class of weapons and we rush them to the field.
Hal Moore was a decorated Vietnam veteran who fought in the Ia Drang campaign. He told of the push and shove of the battle and how he would, from time to time, step back and reflect on what was happening and what wasn't happening. Political leaders are deprived of the ability to think or reflect on the context of a situation because they are overwhelmed by too much information and too little time. They don't have the luxury of a tiny interval between the act and the impulse.
Today's battles, which will probably happen at lightning speed, may not allow such a luxury as reflection. Hypersonic missiles give their targets little time for decision-making and might force ill-informed and ill-advised counter decisions. An efficient weapon system can be created by autonomously operating in swarms, connected via the internet in a network of systems. A mistake by one could cause a domino effect. The digital world has an emphasis on speed.
It will be necessary to find ways to program our weapon systems to prevent independent aggression with systems that are so far flung and automated. An equally important goal is to identify ways to prevent the decision makers from resorting to violence.
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