US District Judge William Orrick rejected the claim that it was not responsible for the racist abuse suffered by the ex-factory worker.
The jury had awarded Diaz over 120 million dollars in damages, but the judge slashed the amount to just over 15 million dollars. He wrote that the new award of 1.5 million is the highest award supported by the evidence and can be nine times the amount in US law.
The jury heard that the factory was filled with racism. The n-word and other slurs were 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 800-273-3217 The employees harassed him. His supervisors and the broader management structure did not respond. Supervisors joined in on the abuse, one going so far as to threaten and draw a racist caricature near his workstation.
The company wanted to limit the damages to $300,000 each.
AdvertisementThe ruling said that he wasseparated from the company without warning in May 2016 after working at the factory for over a year. He received training and certification fromTesla for his job operating a forklift, but his paychecks came from a staffing agency. He sued in October of last year.
Orrick noted that after the trial,Tesla asked the court for a judgement as a matter of law that it is not liable, or alternatively, for a new trial and to reduce the amount of damages. The law that prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts was enacted in 1981.
Orrick denied the motion for a judgment as a matter of law.
[T]he jury had a legally sufficient basis to find Tesla liable on two grounds. First, it found in a special verdict that Tesla qualified as an employer of Diaz under the law, even if not on paper. It could have reasonably found that this employment relationship was governed by an implied-in-fact contract. Second, it could have found that Diaz was an intended beneficiary of the contract between Tesla and the staffing agency. As a result, Diaz was entitled to bring the Section 1981 claim to enforce his rights under that contract. On the remaining issues, Tesla waived its legal challenge to Diaz's state-law negligent supervision claim. And Tesla's motion for a new trial is also denied; the weight of the evidence amply supports the jury's liability findings.