Western intelligence, war photographers, and thousands of hours of unverified camera footage posted to social media have depicted the defining images of Russia's invasion of Ukraine: destroyed, burnt out and abandoned Russian tanks and other military vehicles, blocking roads or stuck in ditches.
The Ukrainian army's ability to target and destroy vehicles, as well as its large delays to advance convoys, is what helped it repel Russia's initial plan for a lightning advance and capture of Kyiv and other major cities.
Thousands of shoulder-launched, portable rocket launchers have been provided by western countries since the invasion began, and small groups of Ukrainian troops have used their terrain and Russia's tactics to their advantage.
The weapons used by both sides are compact and heavy.
The tactical battalion group is the primary fighting unit of the country's army and is one of the main outcomes of a root-and-branch reorganization of the Russian armed forces. The US estimates that 100 of Russia's roughly 170BTGs have been deployed in Ukraine.
They were expected to be multi-theatre operators with the ability to shift from rapid assault to long-range attacks and support operations for other units.
Their low number of infantry troops and heavy reliance on vehicles make them vulnerable to attacks on their flanks or rear. In a war where the terrain, the tactics and the level of Ukrainian military capabilities mean theBTGs are not fighting against similarly deployed and armed units, that is especially true.
The invasion of Ukraine by a small group of advisers was a shock to many of the Russian troops deployed on the country's border.
The vehicles that were abruptly ordered to cross the border were in a poor state of maintenance and often had low quality spare parts, according to western intelligence officials and defence analysts. There are a lot of photos of Russian equipment abandoned in mud-clogged fields or with rupturing tires.
The plan called for a rapid attack and capture of key cities like Mariupol. It meant fighting for control of major junctions and moving quickly down major roads.
Ukrainian troops came up with two conclusions. They realized that an armored column was only as wide as the road and could only move as fast as the front vehicles. Defending troops realized they could operate freely in the forests, fields and villages along the side of the road.
Russian vehicles were vulnerable to ambushes from small teams of Ukrainian troops because of the lack of infantry cover on their flanks.
The use of troop-carried, shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles, such as the US-made Javelin, has been key to these ambushes.
They were sent to Ukraine before the invasion began to allow western military instructors to teach their troops how to use them, and are now arriving in their thousands from countries all across the Nato alliance. The supplies are a key part of the resistance to the invasion.
The missile's tracking system allows troops to quickly leave the location of attack before a projectile strikes its target, while its compact size makes it easy to carry. A double warhead can cause serious damage to Russian tanks.
Other videos show troops using lighter, less powerful and harder to aim rocket-propelled grenades, or one-man next generation light anti-tank weapons to achieve the same outcome.
Western intelligence officials agree that one of Russia's most costly military mistakes was its failure to destroy the Ukrainian air force and air defence systems in the opening hours of the invasion.
Russia did not gain air supremacy in the skies above the battlefield, a position it has used to devastating effect in Syria, because of that failure.
In addition, the use of surface-to-air missiles by Ukrainian troops to successfully attack Russian helicopters and low-flying fighter jets in support of ground forces has deepened Moscow's reticence over using too much air power. It has reduced its attack potential.
Russia has lost at least 28 aircraft and helicopters so far in the invasion compared to just 10 from the Ukrainian air force, according to the Oryx blog.
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