Why war in Ukraine means the end of the liberal world order

The Week

Vladimir Putin. Illustrated | Getty Images, iStock

On August 5, 1990, President George H.W. Bush held a press conference on the South Lawn of the White House. Bush took questions from reporters after reviewing developments related to the invasion of Kuwait. Bush said this aggression against Kuwait would not stand, and it was the most memorable words of the crisis.

The Coen Brothers film The Big Lebowski was a satire on Bush's awkward delivery. It was funny, but more so because of Bush's vision of international politics. In the wake of the Second World War, a vision was created that promised an American-led world in which states would fight only in defense of their territories. In his address to a joint session of Congress in September, Bush would describe that vision as a new world order. Others talked about a new global community, the end of history, or a rules-based international order.

The new world order never lived up to its billing despite the success of the First Persian Gulf War. The wars in the former Yugoslavia showed that ghosts of Europe could not be easily exorcised. Ethnic, ideological, and religious conflicts continued in the world. We were reminded that we were not immune to those tensions. The wars of occupation raised doubts about whether our leadership could meet the high standards they set for themselves. The revival of great power competition with China was conventional wisdom by the 2010s. Donald Trump's election raised serious questions about whether the American public was willing to continue paying the costs of liberalism.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is different to previous crises. It feels like a decisive end to the era that Bush proclaimed on the White House lawn, rather than a distressing violation of the post-Cold War norm. The most important events seem to be more important than temporally distant ones because of recency bias. There are at least three reasons to think that something fundamental has changed.

The Russian attack is a case of interstate aggression that was supposed to be forgotten in the history books. The last 30 years have not been a paradise of peace. There have been few direct military confrontations between internationally recognized states. Civil wars, failed states, and non-state actors have been associated with much of the violence.

In recent speeches, Vladimir Putin has made it clear that he doesn't think of Ukraine as a legitimate state. The conflict might be compared to the ongoing tensions over Taiwan. The differences are not only that other major powers do not recognize Taiwan or that China has not attacked it. Russia promised to respect the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine in the so-called Budapest Memorandum of 1994. International agreements don't really have the force of law despite their impressive language. Russia is renouncing an explicit international commitment despite its claim to be defending the public.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 is an exception to the decline of interstate war. The United States sought at least the pretense of U.N. authorization and international participation, following the script established by the First Gulf War. Russia's conduct is not just aggressive but also unprovoked. Even as they continue to offer indirect economic support, China has so far avoided endorsing the operation in principle.

It also matters where you are. The worst atrocities of the 20th century were committed in Ukraine. The environs were dubbed " Bloodlands" by historian Timothy Snyder. The worst-case scenario of a world without borders or effective sovereignty is presented by Eastern Europe. One of the reasons nationalist movements are so powerful in the region is the direct memories of massacre and oppression. The post-Cold War settlement was designed to prevent the conditions from recurring where they had already done so much damage. Russian revisionism is fatal to the new world order in a way that bloody fighting in the Balkans was not.

The present situation is distinguished by American powerlessness. The United States and its European allies cannot do a lot to solve the problem, and trying too hard can make the problem worse. The threat of nuclear war is the main reason. After the debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military resources and political will were exhausted. The cost of sanctions on Russia's main export is raised by high inflation. According to recent reports, the Biden administration will not target energy for fear of alienating European allies that rely on Russian natural gas and driving up already high prices at the pump. Liberal theorists believe war is less likely between trading partners. They are correct, but not with the results they hope for.

The quality of the last few days was explained by this combination of factors. For the first time in a generation, major world events are proceeding without the illusion of American control. Americans woke up to a new world when Putin announced the beginning of combat operations. The old order had serious flaws and blind spots, including a naive refusal to acknowledge Russian interests and vulnerabilities that is a partial cause. I think we will miss it now that it is gone.