The US military relied heavily on special-operations forces during the Vietnam War.
The war strategy was supported by individual units such as the Army Green Berets, Navy SEALs, and Air Commandos.
Military Assistance Command Vietnam- Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) was a covert special-operations unit that conducted operations in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, North Vietnam, and elsewhere.
Their missions were highly classified. All of the unit's members were wounded at least once or killed in action. Their effectiveness was matched by the outsize risk they faced. The teams from MACV-SOG achieved great results.
A SOG team is getting ready for an operation.
The picture is courtesy.
The North Vietnamese and Vietcong went to extreme lengths to kill or capture the troops.
A mole in the headquarters of the MACV-SOG gave the North Vietnamese information about the recon teams' operations. SOG operators in the field were often at a bigger disadvantage than they realized.
The "SOG problem" at its root was attacked by the North Vietnamese. The deadliest day in the unit's history was in August 1968 when 18 Green Berets were killed in an attack on a forward operating base near Da Nang.
In the middle of the winter holidays, the North Vietnamese launched a surprise attack on New Year's Day.
Wishing for the new year.
One of the US military policemen was wounded during the Tet Offensive in 1968.
Associated Press
The North Vietnamese and Vietcong usually planned or launched attacks during US or Vietnamese holidays, in order to compensate for the US's technological superiority.
The most well-known example is the Tet Offensive. The massive, coordinated assault across South Vietnam was launched during local new year's celebrations and helped turn the war in North Vietnam's favor.
John Meyer, a legendary Green Beret who completed two tours with MAVG-SOG, said that they always had heightened alert for all US and major Vietnamese holidays.
When the base was prepared, they rarely hit it. Meyer told Insider that they preferred the element of surprise, such as the August 23, 1968, attack at FOB 4 in Da Nang, an attack launched after more than a year of planning and planned to strike on a moonless night.
A few days before New Year's Eve 1968, the SOG camp commander at Phu Bai ordered his troops to prepare for a surprise attack.
Phu Bai airfield was south of Hue in April 1965,
The US Marine Corps. Sgt.
The base commander had a number of indications of an attack. The base lounge had markers on the roof which attackers would use to guide mortar rounds. A local worker was caught by a Green Beret counting steps to the camp lounge, a tactic to guide mortar or artillery rounds.
The SOG compound was supposed to be highly classified. The SOG base was used as a launchpad for cross-border operations and the North Vietnamese had a lot of agents and spies.
Meyer wrote extensively about the secret war between the US and Cambodia and said that SOG's took defensive measures.
The Special Forces men stayed close to the internal defense element at the first base. If an attack was launched, we had trenches, mortar pits and areas of responsibility.
There were at least three minefields to the north and the east, the first being the old French one, and two additional ones put into place by the SF.
The SOG operators were ready for an attack on New Year's Eve. Their base only faced a few poorly-sighted mortar rounds. Disaster struck SOG on the field in Laos.
A disaster on New Year's.
The Ho Chi Minh Trail is in Laos.
Sog.
While the SOG teams were waiting for an attack, Recon Team Diamondback was on a recon mission in Laos.
The final hours of 1968 were when a forward air controller made sure the team was ok.
On January 1, 1969 RT Diamondback called for an urgent tactical extraction because of heavy enemy activity in the area. The sheer numbers of the North Vietnamese made it almost certain that they would find the SOG operators.
Chaos erupted when the SOG radioman was talking to the controller. The air controller heard loud noises and fire. He tried to contact the team.
A South Vietnamese member of the team came on the radio and told the plane that three of the team's American members had been killed in a surprise attack.
Members of the MacV-SOG have indigenous operators.
The US Army has a special operations command.
The South Vietnamese of the team had been left uninjured, which was a calculated move by the North Vietnamese to undermine the SOG teams and sow division among their members.
Killing only Americans left the teams shorthanded and was meant to stoke fears about North Vietnam's involvement in the South Vietnamese military. The North was thought to have tens of thousands of troops and support personnel in the South by the late 1960s.
At first, the tactic worked. The commitment and loyalty of their South Vietnamese members began to be questioned. Strong personal leadership at the tactical and organizational level helped maintain the unit's cohesiveness.
Team leaders were chiefly responsible for their team and culture, because the organization was inherently flexible. They had to dismiss any distrust created by the North Vietnamese tactic.
The SOG teams were able to cross the fence again.
A Hellenic Army veteran, a defense journalist, and a graduate of the University of Baltimore are some of the things that Stavros Atlamazoglou is.
