Scott Atlas, a White House adviser, used his position to advocate for the spread of the disease and tried to block testing for it.
The previous administration's response to the coronaviruses crisis has been investigated by the House Select Subcommittee. Some of the details of the conflicts between politicians and public health would be released via press releases from subcommittee members. The group issued a major report on Friday that puts all of the details in one place.
The report confirms suspicions that the Trump administration tried to manipulate the public narrative about its response. Having it all in one place with the evidence to back it up still provides a valuable function, even though reading may make you feel like you know this.
Sidelining the CDC.
The CDC held a press conference in February of 2020 in which Nancy Messonnier warned about the potential for COVID-19 to interfere with life in the US. The subcommittee heard testimony that the CDC was blocked from holding any further press conferences for three months because of her somber warning, which angered then- President Trump and caused the US to experience its first deadly surge of infections.
The CDC tried to publish guidelines for religious organizations that recommended using masks and suggested suspending choirs and using virtual services. The Office of Management and Budget changed that language.
Testing guidance was the target of the administration. In August, the CDC issued guidelines that suggested that people who were exposed to the disease didn't need to be tested. It took a month for the guidelines to return. Scott Atlas, who advocated for allowing the virus to generate immunity by spreading widely, was the one who inserted the problematic advice, according to Deborah Birx. The attempt to eliminate his interference and restore science-based testing guidelines was opposed by some administration officials.
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Atlas and Paul Alexander advocated for the administration to let the virus spread. Alexander's other claim to fame was to rewrite the CDC's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports in order to make it seem less alarming. Robert Redfield, director of the CDC, advised staff to destroy Alexander's email because it was considered an attempt to destroy evidence of political interference.
Beyond the CDC.
The CDC was the primary target of interference, according to the subcommittee. The documents obtained by the subcommittee show that political appointees pushed the FDA to approve hydroxychloroquine even though there was never any evidence that it worked.
The administration hadn't started working with suppliers of diagnostic and protective equipment over a month after declaring a public health emergency, according to testimony. White House officials would sometimes steer non-competitive contracts to companies with no history of working with the government or providing medical supplies, including one company that was formed just as the Pandemic started.
The evidence gathered by the subcommittee paints a picture of an administration's response to the swine flue that was driven by a mix of solid public health advice, political considerations, unscientific personal opinion, and incompetence. The degree to which the latter three were dominant helps explain why the US stumbled so badly in the first year of the Pandemic.
