World Series: The sports data pioneer who spotted baseball's big fix of 1919

Eight members of the 1919 Chicago White Sox team were punished
Hugh Fullerton, a 46-year old sportswriter, was concerned the night before the first game of the 1919 World Series. He was certain the series would be rigged.

Fullerton was in Chicago with the Chicago White Sox and was staying at the same hotel as Christy Mathewson, a legendary former pitcher. They discussed how they might tell if a game is being fixed.

Mathewson described the types of plays that can indicate something sinister, such as a misplaced throw at first base or a pitch that was slightly off-target.

Fullerton had his own notes and records of plays during games. Sports analytics was not yet a thing. They agreed to monitor any instances that might be questionable and highlight them.

The Black Sox Scandal followed, which saw eight Chicago baseball players banned from Major League Baseball for their entire lives two years later in 1921. Fullerton was crucial.

Despite all the difficulties he faced in his life and the reluctance of baseball to admit to the dark influences that shaped its early destiny, he was a pioneer who's remarkable early achievements helped lay the foundation for global sport's transformation through data.

The data points are activated when the centre-forward of your favorite football team looks up and attempts to score a goal. You will see the position of your favorite football team's centre-forward, their speed, movement of the ball, and the state of play.

This event will be added on to the thousands of matches.

Like almost all other sports, football has experienced a data revolution. The results of this analysis have influenced the game of football. Basketball players are more likely to attempt three point shots in the modern era.

This analytical explosion was in large part triggered by Moneyball (film and book) which used a new approach to baseball.

It is not well-known that many sports used data collection systems and analysis dating back to Victorian times. Hugh S Fullerton, one of the pioneers of this technology in baseball, was one of these sports. External-link

Fullerton was born in Ohio in 1873. He fell in love with baseball as a child and although he did write fiction and reported on other subjects, baseball was his favorite subject. Fullerton loved numbers, and eventually collected detailed information about every game attended.

Fullerton's diagrams and notes published in The American Magazine

Fullerton wanted to make use of the data he had collected, not to keep records but to determine how games were won or lost. Fullerton believed that his mathematical methods could predict the season's worth of results, based on the mathematical values he assigned players and positions.

He was able to predict boldly each year's World Series with the help of the system.

He rose to fame in 1906 when he selected the Chicago White Sox's 'hitless wonders to defeat the Chicago Cubs despite them having won an unprecedented 116 regular season games. He predicted that the Sox would win the first and third games, while the Cubs would win the second. It would then rain the fourth day. Each prediction was spot-on.

He wrote an article for The American Magazine entitled "The Science of Baseball" in May 1910. He shared some of his methods and included diagrams that showed theories and deductions. He was the first to publish the shorthand markings that he used for denoting hits, batted balls and pitches.

His new approach was not liked by traditionalists, as more recent innovators have discovered. Baseball Magazine received a complaint from Fullerton that he "would have us believe good ball can only come to those men who are able to use a tape-measure and a tee square and have a deep understanding of algebra and fractions".

Fullerton used his data to predict the winners of the 1916, 1917, 1915 and 1916 World Series. This was often contrary to conventional wisdom. He also included the exact number of games required to win using his own ratings system.

These words were weighty in 1919 when he spoke out about the Chicago White Sox and Cincinnati Reds. He was correct.

Chuck Gandil was the White Sox's first baseman. He is pictured here in court in 1921.

Chuck Gandil, White Sox's first baseman, was the ringleader. In a Sports Illustrated interview, he admitted that he was the ringleader 37 years later.

In mid-September, he had been in discussions with gamblers. This was weeks before the first match. He was asked if the World Series could be purchased. By the end of September, he had several accomplices.

Gandil knew that star pitcher Eddie Cicotte had financial troubles after he bought a farm. Six other people agreed to help with varying degrees.

The conspirators agreed to pay $100,000 each. This would have been about $1.6 million today, which is not much compared to the current MLB salaries. However, Cicotte was earning a yearly salary of $5,000.

Rumours abound. Fullerton was concerned enough to report that Gandil had already received his first cash payment. Cicotte found $10,000 cash under his hotel pillow that night, and he went to sleep. They could not go back.

Fullerton sent a message to his syndicated papers, advising them to "Advise all to not bet on the series." There are ugly rumours floating. This warning was ignored by many and not printed. Nobody would have believed that a World Series could be fraudulent.

White Sox pitcher Eddie Cicotte

The first game of the best-of-9 series, a new format, took place at Cincinatti’s Redland Field on a gorgeous autumn afternoon. All those involved knew Cicotte, White Sox pitcher, would signal the end of the plot: if he hits the first Reds batter, it was clear that the fix was in place.

Although his first pitch was called a strike by the Reds, the second hit Maurice Rath in the back. As he walked to the first base, the Reds continued to make money.

The White Sox were considered slight favorites before the match. However, Fullerton calculated that they had a 71% chance to win using his own methods. Game one was a 9-1 win for the Reds. Fullerton rang three plays in dark pen, each one attributed to Cicotte.

He circled six plays for another Reds win after game 2. Ray Schalk, White Sox catcher, complained to Bill Gleason about Cicotte's pitching that was not consistent with Schalk's expectations. He said that the pitcher had "crossed him" four times in the fourth inning of game 2, something he had never done during the rest of his season.

Cicotte was not able to play in game three, which was won by the White Sox 3-1. However, he did return for game 4. He pitched as agreed after the previous spat with Schalk. He found other ways to ruin the game.

Fullerton took two notes to highlight the suspicious plays Cicotte made with the ball, allowing the Reds two runs.

The Reds were leading 4-3 by the end of the eighth game. Fullerton was disappointed. Although he had no proof, he was certain that the series was correct.

Before the first pitch, he walked by a well-known gambler and was advised to place some money on Reds. "It's going be the biggest inning you have ever seen!" He was told. It was. After building a lead of 10-1, Claude Williams surrendered four runs to Reds before the Reds won the game 10-5. The series was ended.

It was close even with eight conspirators. Fullerton believed that his original prediction would be proved true without any foul play.

He knew that the numbers weren't lying. Nine errors were made by Sox players that he suspects of being involved in the fix, compared to four by the rest. They allowed 21 runs, compared with 14 for the non-fixers.

The players were clearing out their clubhouses and getting ready to leave for the off-season. Charles Comiskey, White Sox owner, sent word that he was putting the pay cheques of the players under suspicion and asked them to come to his office to get them. They didn't do that; they fled the stadium without receiving their money.

There were rumors and many newspapers that covered the series, but no one wrote about a solution. Fullerton's post-series piece was not published after he prepared it. Fearing being accused of libel, both the Chicago Herald-Examiner (Chicago Tribune) and Chicago Tribune decided not to print the allegations.

Fullerton was disappointed. Fullerton was frustrated. There was no one else interested in uncovering what many suspect.

He was furious and set out into the wilderness to fish. He was furious when he returned from fishing to find no action had been taken.

The Evening World in New York eventually published his story. It was edited to be less inflamatory and finally published in December 1919. It didn't force authorities to investigate and made the author a pariah. He was accused of writing hogwash out of bitterness and personal gain, as his prediction had not come true.

Baseball Magazine, with the support of franchise owners, called Fullerton an "erratic" who should "keep it shut when he is in the presence intelligent people".

Even though Fullerton's article did not immediately change anything in the matter, there were still suspicions about gambling and baseball.

An investigation was launched into possible fixing of a game between Philadelphia Phillies and Chicago Cubs in September 1920. Witnesses claimed that the 1919 series was fixed, and they named several White Sox Players. Within days, several confessed.

Chicago Tribune publishes a satirical cartoon in response to the 1919 fix

The trial of Eddie Cicotte et. al vs the State of Illinois opened in Chicago in June 1921.

Three signed confessions were missing, and the players could face up to five years imprisonment. After a month of testimony, a variety of conspiracy charges were brought against the players. It took them three hours to return a clean sweep with not guilty verdicts.

The players were not happy. Judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis (Commissioner of Baseball) issued a statement stating that any player who learned of a possible fix but did not notify his club would be expelled from baseball for life.

The eight White Sox were among the first to be notified. They are now known as the Black Sox. They never played Major League Baseball again.

Fullerton was disgusted at the whole thing and decided to quit baseball reporting. Fullerton's data analysis skills would not be widely used until 1947 when the Brooklyn Dodgers hired their own statistician for advice on game strategy.

Fullerton also died that year. In 1964, the Baseball Hall of Fame awarded him the Taylor Spink award posthumously. This was his final chance to receive the recognition he had been seeking all his life.

His greatest accomplishments are in bringing one of the biggest scandals in sport to the attention of the public and changing how data is accepted into the sports world.

Rob Haywood's book Many Impossible Things, The Ingenious Evolution of Football Data will be published in 2022.