We Now Know Why Biden Was in a Hurry to Exit Afghanistan

There was a moment during Tuesday's Senate hearing about the withdrawal from Afghanistan where it became apparent why President Joe Biden wanted to get the troops out as soon as possible.
It was when Gen. Mark Milley (chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) explained to the other chiefs-the top officers of Army, Air Force and Navy-why we had to withdraw by August 31. The Doha Agreement, which President Donald Trump signed with the Taliban early 2020, without any participation from the Afghan government, required that all foreign forces be withdrawn. Milley stated that if the U.S. troops were not gone by August, the Taliban would have resumed fighting. We would also have required 30,000 troops to stop the attacks. This would have resulted in many casualties.

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Milley testified that he, the chiefs and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin were among those who advised Biden to continue keeping 2,500 U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan past the Aug. 31 deadline. They would instead be assigned to a diplomatic mission.

It is highly unlikely that the Taliban would have made the distinction. It is highly unlikely that the Taliban would have noticed this distinction. Rather, they would see 2,500 U.S. soldiers as 2,500 U.S. troopers, regardless of their official mission. Thus, the Taliban would continue fighting as Milley stated. Biden would then be faced with an extremely difficult choice: withdraw while under attack, or send in another 35,000 troops.

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Some historical-psychological perspective is worth noting. The generals pushed for an escalation in the war in Afghanistan during the first nine months of Barack Obama's presidency. An increase of 40,000 troops and a shift towards a counterinsurgency strategy (aka nation building). Biden, then vice president, suggested a mere 10,000-troop increase to Afghanistan's army and fight terrorists at the Afghan-Pakistani border. Obama's memoir recalls that Biden advised the relatively inexperienced president to not be boxed by the generals. They will say that they need another 40,000 troops to win the war if they give them 40,000 troops right away. Obama later admitted that Biden was correct.

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As Milley advised Biden to keep 2,500 troops at Afghanistan, while also acknowledging that additional 30,000 might be required if the Taliban re-engage in fighting, it was easy to picture Biden thinking, Theyre trying t to box me in, just as they did before the Vietnam War. This war raged when Biden entered the Senate in 1973, and has shaped Biden's views on war and peace.

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Milley and General Kenneth McKenzie (head of Central Command) both admitted at the hearing that the U.S. army was blind for much of the 20-year long war in Afghanistan. This war is the longest in American history. The officers tried to make the Afghan army conform to their vision. They made them dependent on U.S. technology, support and so collapse became inevitable once we withdrew. Milley noted that Milley and other officers did not pay enough attention to Afghan culture or the corrosive effects on the Afghan government's corruption and lackluster legitimacy. Biden may have wondered, "Why should he listen to what these guys have to say about the war in Afghanistan? Theyve been wrong from the beginning."

Biden made several mistakes, some of which were disastrous, regarding the timing and sequence of his withdrawal. Biden should have pulled out all U.S. citizens and contractors as well as all the Afghan helpers, spy, contractors, and U.S. citizens before withdrawing all troops. He was correct in the end, and the generals now admit they were wrong.