What number of lives could have been saved by the pandemic had the UK government followed science? This question is not easy to answer, but it is not academic. Although it is impossible to quantify the exact number of lives lost due to the political-driven delays in lockdown during the first and second waves of the Second Wave, the numbers are not small.
We would have done better to give scientists the responsibility for pandemic policies. Could we also give them climate change policy? They might actually be better leaders if they use evidence-based methods.
Since the beginning of science, debates have been ongoing about how much power scientists should have in managing society. In his 1626 book New Atlantis, Francis Bacons describes a techno-theocracy that is run by a group of scientists-priests who manipulate the natural world for the benefit of their citizens. Between the two world wars, enthusiasm for technocracies governed and rooted in rationalism grew. This was when HG Wells argued their benefits in The Shape of Things to Come.
While post-second world conflict issues like nuclear power and telecommunications increased the need for technical advice to help inform policies, Solly Zuckerman was the first official scientist adviser of the UK. He was appointed by Harold Wilson in 1964. He stated that advisory bodies are limited to providing advice. The power to make decisions in our system of government must be with the minister involved or the entire government. Scientists who want more should become politicians.
This is the current consensus: ministers make decisions, scientists give advice. David Willetts (a Conservative peer) says that scientists have an implicit contract. In return, they agree that ministers will decide.
Ministers have the final say in all matters. Scientists who want more must become politicians Solly Zuckerman
The equation was not always so simple. One, people in democracy have the right to know what decisions are made. Scientific advice cannot be given behind closed doors. Following the disastrous BSE crisis in the 1990s, where John Gummer, the minister of agriculture, claimed that British beef was safe to consume without any scientific basis (and attempted to get his reluctant daughter to do so), a public inquiry found that science advice to the government must be transparent and open. It is also vital that scientists can communicate with the public to let people know if what they are saying is true. Sir David King, who advised the Blair government regarding the foot-and mouth epidemic and nuclear power, vigorously supported this right.
King created Independent Sage to provide public-facing expert advice. This was due to a perceived lack of transparency at the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies. Chief scientific officers like Patrick Vallance and Chris Whitty have had to navigate the difficult path of the pandemic. They are civil servants and must support the government. However, their careful supervision by ministers at press briefings raised questions about their independence. Tension was evident when government policy diverged from scientific advice during the second round. If a chief physician believes that a government program poses a health risk to the public or downplays dangers, where should they be loyal?
It is time to reconsider the restrictions placed on scientific advisors. The top/tap dichotomy does not acknowledge their wider responsibilities, particularly in the face irresponsible and incompetent governance. While the idea of them refraining from explicit policy recommendations (which includes value judgments), makes sense in normal times. However, Jonathan Birch of London School of Economics suggested that in crisis situations, a mode of normatively-heavy advice that does not include such recommendations may be unconditionally (Do this). He argues that scientific advisers in extremeis should be treated differently.
The on tap model also assumes scientific objectivity, which has been discredited by experts in the social role of science. Sheila Jasanoff, a social scientist, stated in 1990 that the myth that scientists can speak truthfully to power in a non-value-laden manner is a fabrication.
One, scientists who believe they can function unaffected by political pressures but join the government mechanism are lying to themselves. Sage's selection of options was not based on scientific considerations, but political dictates. Sage member John Edmunds stated that the politicians had created [the] strategy, and it was our job to make it work. (The strategy being the fateful controlled-herd immunity scheme). The resulting consequences of July's full relaxation of restrictions was not predicted by modellers, who were not asked to predict it. Whitty, Vallance, and others must have recognized that Dominic Cummings' violation of lockdown rules had consequences for public trust, compliance, and their silence on this matter was not a decision to stay out of politics but a political one.
Science is incompatible with the current political mode that accepts uncertainty and fallibility. Science is easily exploited for political purposes because of these attributes. Jasanoff studied US policies regarding cancer risks and concluded that adversarial regulatory decision-making creates polarization in scientific opinion, which prevents disputes from being resolved. She wrote that knowledge feed into such a process is not conducive to consensus. This was three decades ago. We know this now.
This consideration also exposes the fundamental problem of any notion of rule-by-science. We have to ask: Which science? Science can become a tool for justifying policy and not just for information. The most striking aspect of the denialist movement around Covid-19, vaccines, and climate change is the way that sceptics present themselves as rationalists by presenting cherrypicked data to support fringe views. They can always find experts with plausible qualifications (including Nobel Prizes) to support them. Johnson could also convene a panel lockdown-sceptic scientists last autumn to justify his procrastination.
Expertise cannot be dominated by democracy in every domain.
Even experts of good faith will disagree. This is because different disciplines create different perspectives. This problem is made worse by the persisting hierarchy of sciences that favors hard sciences like virology over the social sciences. Technocrats love hard solutions. Look at how leaders like Hu Jintao in China were trained as engineers to solve social problems in water resource management. Some argue that our response to the pandemic was too focused on epidemiological modeling and did not include adequate input from public-health experts.
The choice of an expert is crucial. Cummings' enthusiasm for science-based policymaking was all well and good until you realized his tendency to anoint unqualified geniuses (sometimes mavericks) with his ire. Cummings' reliance on Tim Gowers, a mathematician, to explain why the early 2020 herd immunity policy was so disastrously wrong was both arbitrary and difficult to examine. Gowers is a smart man, and he was right. However, many experts in epidemiology and public health were already pointing out the flaws in this plan.
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We rightly elect politicians to make judgments and decisions, not to simply enact data or experts' dictates. Robert Evans and Harry Collins, sociologists, said that democracy cannot rule every domain that would damage expertise. Expertise cannot control every domain that would threaten democracy. I don't want scientists at the top. No matter what their education, mature leaders will be able to use science to its full potential. We just need to elect them.
