Russia’s Electronic-Warfare Troops Knocked Out 90 Percent Of Ukraine’s Drones

There are too many failures by the Russian military to list.

Russia's best battalions were decimated by too many attacks. There isn't enough infantry to screen the tanks. Air support is inflexible Too many empty grids were bombarded by the batteries. What would become a long, grinding war was due to inadequate logistical resources.

It is important to note where the Russians achieved their goals. It would be great if we could understand where Ukraine might need to improve. Consider the Kremlin's electronic battlefield-warfare troops.

It took the Russians a few weeks to put their jamming infrastructure in place. They began to speak in numbers that startled Ukrainian commanders.

One of the biggest advantages of the war was the suppression of the Ukrainian drones. The Ukrainians relied on superior intelligence to make their small arsenal more precise than Russia's large arsenal.

The Ukrainians were deprived of precision because of the Russian electronic warfare. Analysts Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds explained in a study that the loss of precision was critical to unit survival for the Russians.

The analysts expected the Russians to jam. The deployment of electronic-warfare systems in easternUkraine was noted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

They included TORN and Svet-KU signals-intelligence systems that can locate Ukrainian units by tracing their radio signals.

The Russian electronic-warfare force was so powerful that it was difficult for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to keep its drones in the air. jamming went up in the year 2021. In February, 28 percent of flights were interfered with, followed by 28 percent in March and 58 percent in April.

Operators of Russia's E.W. systems have a lot of time to set up and coordinate functions. Russian E.W. was so powerful in eastern Ukraine that they held the same positions for seven years.

Russian jamming didn't work very well in the first few weeks after the attack. The E.W. troops were unable to keep up with the Russian battalions.

In March and April, battered Russian forces ended their retreat from central and eastern Ukraine.

Fighter pilots from the Ukrainian air force were the first to experience the effects of Russian jamming. As Russian E.W. complexes began to be deployed, Ukrainian pilots found that they often had their air-to-ground and air-to-air communications jammed.

The ground in the east was thick with Russian jamming devices. The RUSI analysts said that Russia set up E.W. complexes with up to 10 complexes per 13 miles. These complexes were able to disrupt navigation along the front and conduct direction finding to attack Ukrainian planes.

Ukrainian brigades and batteries relied on two broad types of drones to find Russian forces: small, hovering drones and larger, fixed-wing drones. These drones started dropping like flies after Russian jamming confused gps and severed radio links

The life-expectancy of a quad remained around three flights. The average life-expectancy of a fixed-wing UAV was around six flights and only around a third of missions can be said to have been successful.

The RUSI analysts said that 90 percent of the drones the Ukrainians had were shot or crashed by the summer. The authorities in Kyiv had to ask for replacements.

Buying time for Russian troops to reconsolidate in the east and prepare for the summer's fighting was made easier by the drone-massacre.

The army asked the troops to fill the air with electronic noise, and they did it. The Ukrainian armed forces had few precision systems during the early stages of the fighting.

The E.W. troops did a good job. More than a few Russian drones were jammed as well. The RUSI team said that the Russians suffered extensively from these systems.