One of the most capable air-defense systems in the world is the S-400 Triumf from Russia.
One of the few systems that can counter America's air-dominance approach to warfare is the S-400.
Is the S-400's reputation really deserved, or is it just another Russian weapon system that benefits from media manipulation in the interest of furthering foreign weapons sales.
In the few instances where the S-400 has found itself in real combat conditions, its performance has prompted more questions than answers. There are two seemingly counter-intuitive conclusions that we can draw from the extensive research into the S-400.
The system is not as capable as people think. It is one of the most capable air-defense systems.
The air-defense enterprise is complex and often overlooked in popular discussion. The unrealistic expectations of modern air defenses have been made worse by the emergence of hypersonic missiles, which can defeat modern air and missile defense platforms.
Hypersonics' value as a means of overcoming these systems suggests that they can't. No air-defense system in the world can successfully intercept any missile on a consistent basis.
In the December 2000 issue of Arms Control Today, there was a piece written by David Mosher. The original article can't be found on the internet anymore, but it has been re-posted.
The director of the American Physical Society's Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense was previously the head of the National Security Division.
"Nearly everyone underestimates the breadth of the effort that will be required to field effective missile defenses." — "Understanding the Extraordinary Cost of Missile Defense," by David Mosher for the "Arms Control Today."
The development of Russia's S-400 system is thought to have begun in the 1980's. Two years after the fall of the Soviet government, the effort was made public.
Budget constraints dictated a great deal of the S-400's makeup, with an estimated 70% to 80% of its hardware borrowed directly from the S-300 predecessor that began development in the late 1960s.
The primary differences between the older S-300 system and the more modern S-400 came in the form of updated and refined radar systems, improved software, and the inclusion of new missile types to offer flexibility in target intercepts.
The S-400 system's electronic-warfare countermeasures include rapid Frequency-hopping to limit the effectiveness of radar jamming and Agile beam-steering to improve target acquisition and tracking.
Russia's Nebo-M radar system, which combines three different array that broadcast on different frequencies to detect, track, and target low-observable aircraft like America's fifth- generation fighters, is one of the reasons why the S-400's counter-stealth claims The system uses stealth fighter design's inherent detectability against lower-frequency radar bands to make it work.
Modern stealth fighters are designed to delay or prevent detection from higher-frequency radar array broadcasting in parts of the S, C, X, and Ku bands because they are capable of providing a weapons-grade lock.
The L or S bands are not capable of guiding weapons with this accuracy, but they are able to spot stealth fighters.
Most nations don't have the ability to target stealth fighters even when they know they're flying overhead because of the lack of early-warning radar systems. Our full-length feature on this topic can be found here.
Russia's Nebo-M system uses two low-frequency radars to detect stealth fighters as they approach.
The Nebo-M system can be used to target stealth fighters by networking them with Russia's Gamma S1 array, which broadcasts in the X and S-bands.
Modern stealth fighters like the F-35, F-22, J-20, and Su-57 are designed to minimize detection against high-frequency bands, but they can't completely defeat them.
The radar cross-section of the F-35 is said to be around the size of a golf ball, while the F-22's is more like a marble. The world's first operational stealth aircraft, the F-117, had a claimed radar cross-section of.003 square meters.
stealth isn't about preventing detection but rather delaying it for long enough for the fighter aircraft to either strike first or escape a potential threat Your aircraft needs to be close to the array in order to be effective.
The Nebo-M can detect the F-117 at a range of 350 kilometers according to an assessment by the Hellenic Air Force.
Many S-400 counter-stealth claims are based on this detection range, but it fails to acknowledge the difference between detecting a stealth fighter and targeting one.
The detection range for the S-400 system's low-frequency radars is roughly 30 times larger than the F-22 and at least twice the size of the F-35. Detection and targeting ranges for these fighters will be greatly reduced.
The S-400 won't be able to target the F-35 until it flies within 20 miles of the system. In a one-on-one fight between America's F-35A and Russia's S-400, the stealth fighter would almost certainly win due to the upcoming adoption of weapons like the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile.
The AAR GM-ER is an anti-radiation missile that broadcasts radar. The weapon is designed to be carried inside the weapons bay of the F-35 and has a range of at least 60 miles.
The AARGM-ER has a good chance of finding its target without the F-35 being shot down if it is fired from outside the 20-mile targeting envelope.
Russian troops won't have the chance to use that lock as the anti-radiation missile will likely prompt them to power their system down and move. The missile's targeting system can still find its target even if they power down.
This fictional engagement doesn't reflect the reality of large-scale combat between the United States and Russia, as the S-400 is most effective when used as a part of a broader integrated air defense system.
It would be more difficult to engage these systems with F-35s when they are connected with other air defense systems.
Turkey is one of the third-party states that purchase the S-400 without the IADS capabilities.
When not connected with other assets, the S-400's field of view is limited by the horizon. Russia's warfare doctrine can make it hard for it to succeed. Russia's approach to warfare is not focused on securing air dominance.
The Russian understanding that it may lose air superiority in the event of a large-scale conflict against NATO is thought to be the reason for this. Russian doctrine now accepts that it may not control the airspace it is fighting in.
"Rather than seeking to dominate a battlespace, Russia prioritizes flexibility and the ability to adapt to changing conditions in a conflict." — "Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy," Congressional Research Service, March 20, 2020.
Russia's approach to warfare calls for using advanced air-defense systems to mitigate the effectiveness of enemy air defenses and aircraft alike, all while using a high volume of fire to gain and leverage fire superiority. Ground forces are supported by aircraft rather than taking control of the battlespace.
The airspace of a conflict against Russia would most likely be dominated by American or allied forces. It would be difficult to use airborne assets to expand the reach of the S-400. Specific types of attacks can be created by that.
"Without over the horizon sensors, the S-400, and other powerful HIMADS system, are vulnerable to a low-altitude attack by cruise missiles, which, in large numbers, can overwhelm an air defense system." — "Russian S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile System: Is It Worth the Sticker Price?" by Peter A. Wilson and John V. Parachini for the Rand Corporation.
As a result of other factors, this limitation can be worse.
"Geographical factors weigh heavily on a system's usefulness, with mountainous features able to block the systems' sensors. A low-flying target can take advantage of geographical features and the curvature of the earth to avoid an S-400 interception for far longer than a high-flying target." — "Why the S-400 Missile is Highly Effective — If Used Correctly" assessment by the Risk Assistance Network + Exchange.
When the opposition controls the surrounding airspace, these limitations become pressing vulnerabilities.
Because Russian military doctrine calls for securing the airspace immediately around its forces or objectives and then abandoning it when it's no longer required, Russia would likely find it difficult to leverage the S-400's long-range capabilities to the fullest extent in a large scale conflict against the U.S
The S-400 system is considered to be more effective than America's dated but frequently updated Patriot missile systems despite its stated limitations. Low-cost missile and drone technologies may prove too much for the S-400 to survive.
Each missile launch platform in the Russian S-400 battalion is armed with four missiles. Regardless of missile type, the battalion can intercept a maximum of 32 targets before running out of interceptors.
With an outside range of about 400 kilometers, even cargo aircraft like America's C-130 or C-17 could eventually prove effective at eliminating S-400 systems thanks to programs like Rapid Dragon.
It's possible that the data could be transmitted via F-35 flying outside the S-400's target range.
To overwhelm the entire S-400 battalion, oppositional forces need to fire more missiles than they can intercept. It's the same for attritable or suicide drones.
"Against a low-flying cruise missile, an S-400 will more likely find success at a distance in the tens of kilometers rather than in the hundreds. Ultimately, an isolated S-400 battery or even battalion will, therefore, be vulnerable to a saturation standoff attack and may even be destroyed without destroying a single enemy aircraft." — "Why the S-400 Missile is Highly Effective — If Used Correctly" assessment by the Risk Assistance Network + Exchange.
The system's very real limitations in a modern peer-level fight are reflected in the vulnerability to attacks by volume.
Russia claims that the S-400 system has been tested 32 times across six combat exercises with no failures.
It's more likely that Russia doesn't reveal testing failures because they create a heightened perception of Russian prowess.
"During these tests, Russian forces fired an unknown number of interceptors, intercepting an unknown number of targets of unknown capability. Furthermore, Russia reported to state media that 100 percent of the attempted S-400 intercepts were successful."
"To date we have not been able to identify any reports of failed intercept tests involving the S-400. Like our hypothesis involving India, this suggests Russia is concealing most of its developmental tests or other failed intercepts." — "The Global Missile Defense Race: Strong Test Records and Poor Operational Performance," by Shea Cotton and Jeffrey Lewis.
There have been a number of high-profile failures of the S-400 and associated systems.
The need for broad integration across a larger IADS was demonstrated when American and allied forces launched cruise missiles against Syrian targets.
Despite Russia's claims of defending airspace at 400 kilometer ranges with the S-400, the system failed to intercept low-flying cruise missiles before they found their target.
"All this talk that we have secured the whole of Syrian airspace is artistic whistling," Pavel Felgengauer, a Moscow-based military analyst, told Radio Free Europe at the time. "You can more or less defend a perimeter of about 40 kilometers."
The Nebo-M radar array has failed to prevent attacks from small drones like Turkey's Bayraktar TB2 and Israeli cruise missiles in places like Syria.
The limitations of Russia's air defense systems were outlined by Shaza Arif in January of this year. Her assessment was revised by the Air University.
"To destroy the air defense systems, Azerbaijan used decoy aircraft in Armenian territory, which were shot at by the deployed air defense systems. This action exposed the locations of those air defense systems, which were then neutralized by drones.
"Russian air defense systems such as the 2K12 Kub, 9K35 Strela-10, 9K33 Osa, and 2K11 Krug could not intercept a number of drones, which either reached their intended targets or destroyed the air defense system itself. Azerbaijan has also claimed that it destroyed several batteries of the S-300 air defense systems and circulated footage in this regard. This is highly concerning, as it suggests that the S-400, which is the successor of S-300, could have similar vulnerabilities." — "India's Acquisition of the S-400 Air Defense System: Implications and Options for Pakistan" by Shaza Arif for the Centre for Aerospace And Security Studies (CASS).
The success of similar drone attacks in Ukraine over the past five months shows that the air defense systems are very vulnerable.
Many of the system's weaknesses are not unique to the S-400 or Russian air defense systems in general.
The S-400 and S-500 are very capable air-defense systems, but they are limited by the physical, financial, and geographical constraints of the countries that use them.
The S-400 is not a stealth-defeating air defense force field, but it is an effective system that can be supported through a network.
Do you think America should be afraid of the S-400? With systems like the F-35 and F-22 in service and platforms like the B-21, NGAD, and F/A-XX in active development, Uncle Sam should not be shaking in his boots.
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