According to new information from the head of Naval Surface Forces, the initial response to the Bonhomme Richard fire was uncoordinated and hampered by confusion as to which admiral should cobble together Navy and civilian firefighters.
Sailors might have missed a small window to contain the fire because of the discombobulation. When the CO and his crew were waiting on the pier, the admiral who didn't have authority to issue an order pleaded with him to get back on the ship and fight the fire. Brown said in an interview that the admiral refused to intervene when he found the situation so dire.
After seeing lower-level leaders struggle to communicate or fight the fire, Brown set up an ad hoc chain of command to coordinate trying to save the ship. After confusion over who had control over the ship, the fleet's operational chain of command declined to step in.
There were a number of failures that led up to the fire and the response. Additional details and a new perspective on how the fire response came together are offered by Brown.
Brown told Defense News that he is facing a letter of censure. The Consolidated Disposition Authority cleared him of any blame for the loss of the ship. He said he was not questioned about the fire.
The Secretary of the Navy is still in the process of reviewing the command investigation and has not yet made any final decisions, according to a spokesman for the Secretary.
Brown said he should have played a supporting role when the fire broke out. He made calls to the Naval Sea Systems Command to find out if the ship needed to be towed out to sea.
He was concerned that the fire in the lower vehicle storage area was being missed by the crew and firefighters. The crew of the ship was slow to call for help and did not do anything to stop the fire from spreading to other parts of the ship, according to the investigation.
The ship's commanding officer told Brown that he and the crew had left the ship and were on the pier. During the firefight, the crew pulled out of the ship twice.
According to a Navy instruction laying out fire prevention and fire response responsibilities for ships in maintenance, Thoroman should have been coordinating with the Federal Fire Department and the Southwest Regional Maintenance Center. The pier at the naval base was being worked on.
He was unsure of how to coordinate the resources that were at his disposal, according to Brown. The federal firefighters had been pulled out of the ship multiple times and the Navy firefighters lacked the gear they needed to tackle the fire on their own.
He called the commander of the Strike Group 3 around 11 a.m.
Brown said that Sobeck had to get down to that pier and provide leadership and guidance because they were all sitting at the end of the pier. He said he was getting in the car and was on his way.
Brown took other actions, including some outside of his normal authorities. Fitzgerald and Russell were ordered to leave the pier they shared with Bonhomme Richard even if it meant damaging brows and cables.
He said that the firefight was disorganized.
When Brown directed his staff to contact the U.S. 3rd Fleet, they were told it was not their problem.
3rd Fleet briefed on the manning, training and equipement status of all the ships in maintenance with Brown on the call.
The retired flag officer told Defense News 3rd Fleet should have been in charge of the failed efforts by the ship captain. The flag officer didn't want to say anything on the record.
After the staff-level call failed, Brown set up a call with the 3rd Fleet Commander.
We need to formally establish a new command structure. He told me he wouldn't do it because the ship was in maintenance. I said okay.
Conn told Defense News that the Bonhomme Richard was not under his control. Navy Chief of Information Rear Adm. Charlie Brown told Defense News that there were two policies that were not consistent. The third fleet was the operational commander.
Pacific Fleet should have taken responsibility for the ship via its operational chain of command despite the fact that two documents were expected to play a supporting role, according to Vice Adm. Rich Brown.
Brown went into the ad hoc command center in his office and told everyone that Sobeck was in charge and that they all understood their supporting roles.
The Pacific Fleet commander was John Aquilino.
The C2 is degrading on the pier, there's no focus of effort, people are off doing their own things. I told him that I asked Scott to take command, but he didn't. Phil is now working for me.
The admiral told him to put the fire out.
Brown didn't dispute the Navy's accounting of the rest of the five days of fighting, but he did dispute the investigation's accounting of how the command and control fell apart.
The retired three-star said that the same command and control flaw played a part in the collision of destroyers Fitzgerald and McCain and the 2020 fire on Bonhomme Richard. One of the recommendations Brown made was to bring back a Cold War-era command structure that had two chains of command, one for ships in maintenance and the other for the basic phase.
The command and control setup should have been changed in order to prevent the Fitzgerald and McCain tragedies.
I was told that it wasn't going to happen. The type commanders are not in the operational chain of command, which is what they all told me.
With the operational chain of command in charge of the ships in maintenance, Brown's job was to make sure ships were up to date on their certifications, which Bonhomme Richard was. The operational chain of command had made it clear in the past that the ship was always their ship, regardless of what phase of maintenance, training or operations it was in.
When the fire broke out, Bonhomme Richard would have been under Brown's control and he could have taken more aggressive measures.
The Navy must learn from this disaster and make the proper reforms to prevent another ship from being destroyed, even if the investigation is incomplete or inaccurate, according to Brown.
Command and control was an issue on the day of the fire, but other Navy leaders disagreed that 3rd Fleet should have been more involved.
The Navy made it clear at the time that Conn was given the assignment not in his capacity as 3rd Fleet commander but as an individual three-star admiral with the experience to lead a command investigation.
When the fire investigation was released, Conn said that the Navy policy was for ships in maintenance to go through the type commander. One of the recommendations will be to review where the operational chain should be aligned as part of the oversight.
Rear Adm. Paul Spedero, who led the major fires review that accompanied the Bonhomme Richard fire investigation, said there had been confusion between administrative control and operational control in the past. The Navy made reforms after the Fitzgerald and McCain accidents.
The Bonhomme Richard fire response had some issues.
The Navy spokesman said that there were multiple contributing factors that caused confusion. There was a failure to properly train for a fire in an industrial environment. Some of the policies were unnecessary and in conflict with each other. The command and control in the circumstances of the industrial environment became varied due to practices and procedures that were inconsistent with written policies.
While the ship was on fire, Brown was never interviewed. Conn asked five questions about the roles and functions of the type commander in an email to him. Brown said Conn never followed up with a formal interview.
Before the report came out, Brown had no idea he would be blamed for the ship's demise.
When you look at the findings of facts, in the findings of facts behind my name, they just don't make sense. Why won't they speak to me?
Brown was in charge of the investigation into the COVID-19 outbreak on Theodore Roosevelt. If you want to consider anyone for any type of discipline, you need to interview them.
The spokesman said that retired Vice Adm. Rich Brown's email input was included in the investigation.
He said that the investigation was thorough, that it was being reviewed by all levels of the chain of command, and that it was valuable in helping to identify the causes of shipboard fires.
The consolidated disposition authority for this incident is the Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Sam Paparo, who sent Brown a letter in December stating that he had determined the case did not warrant any action.
Brown said his lawyer warned him in June that the Navy Secretary was going to send a letter of censure.
He doesn't know what facts changed in the past six months.
Lauren Hanzel, a former Navy judge advocate general who works in private practice as a military defense attorney, told Defense News that it was unusual that Conn and his team didn't interview Brown in the first place.
She said that sending a censure after theCDA cleared Brown is more unusual.
Brown described the process as being similar to the loss of a capital ship. The Navy will look bad in this case if you look at due process and the appearance of fairness.
Brown's retirement in 2020 makes the benefit of censure less clear and appears political.
Brown told Defense News that the censure letter was delayed as he recovered from a medical procedure, but that he will get it in July.
The Navy punishes three-stars for political expediency without examining root causes and making reforms, according to Brown.
The Navy is destined to make the same mistakes again and again because we don't have the proper command and control.
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